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Abstract 
 
In geography the key theoretical registers of assemblage theory and Actor Network Theory have 
been psychoanalytic-semiotic, materialist and vitalist (emphasising affect). In contrast, this paper 
indicates the original influence and continued relevance of philosophical pragmatism’s action-
oriented approach for assemblage and ANT. It suggests how a pragmatist understanding of 
human experience, situation and reason offers a different perspective on the nature of emergent 
and relational space in assemblages and networks. This perspective extends existing pragmatist 
work in geography to explore the distinctive, hyper-relational spatialities of human activity in a 
world of acting things, suggesting wider implications for progress in human geography. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Assemblage theory has been taken up extensively in geography (Muller & Schurr 2016; Anderson 
et al 2012; Muller 2015; Smith 2017; Dewsbury 2011; McFarlane 2011ab; Farias 2011; Farias and 
Bender 2010; Kamalipour & Peimani 2015). It is part of a wider intellectual movement that is 
anti-foundationalist, emphasising process, emergence and immanence (DaLanda 2016). 
Alongside this has been the growing influence of vitalism: the idea that organisms have a life 
force beyond their physical-chemical compositions.  Also implicated is the extension of vitalism 
into materialism as new materialism, in which objects, materials, substances can also be 
considered to possess vital forces of various kinds rather than being inert, unchanging ‘stuff’ 
(Bennett 2010; Latham & McCormack 2004). The idea of vital environments in which non-
human elements act in certain ways can be seen as a re-articulation of long-standing 
environmental sensibilities in geography, as well as development of ideas on relational and non-
representational space (Allen 2016; Thrift 2007).  Assemblage theory also connects to Actor 
Network Theory (although the closeness of this relationship is disputed - Anderson et al 2012; 
Muller and Schurr 2016) and the idea of effects in human/non-human networks of actants 
(Latour 2007). Going on alongside these developments are post-Cartesian critiques of the 
sovereignty of human reason, along with the decentring of human action and rationality from its 
former dominance in understanding action and effects.  Action is distributed away from human 
subjects and their reflexivity and into networks of actants or assemblages, in which the driving 
force is affect in the form of distributed desire (or ‘will’).  Affect may emanate from human 
bodies but is more a product of the co-constitutive properties of the emerging assemblage itself.   
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The material and psychoanalytical aspects (objects and affects) of assemblage theory and ANT 
are the ones that have been most developed in geography (Anderson et al 2012; Muller and 
Schurr 2016; McGuirk et al 2016; Prince 2016) owing more to poststructuralist and 
psychoanalytic approaches of continental philosophy than to pragmatism.  Yet philosophical 
pragmatism had a direct influence on the original development of ANT and of assemblage 
theory.  What I suggest in this paper is that these pragmatist strains have a special significance in 
progressing assemblage and ANT work in geography, and at the same time have wider 
implications for ongoing research beyond assemblage and ANT in human geography as a whole. 
 
Pragmatism in geography 
 
A call for the development of pragmatist thinking is not alien to geography.  There has been a 
growing amount of attention paid to pragmatism in geographical scholarship.  The dominance of 
analytical philosophy and of Marxism in geography meant the earlier influences from Chicago 
School sociology in the 1920s and 1930s were eclipsed for most of the 20th century, with 
pragmatism being revived with developments in the 1970s and 80s humanistic geography and 
the exploration of human experience and intentionality (Ley and Samuels 1978; Jackson and 
Smith 1984 – see Barnes 2008). Jackson and Smith (1984) looked at how pragmatism informed 
the ethnographic work of the Chicago School in taking social context and situated knowledge 
seriously.  These departures influenced subsequent developments in social and cultural 
geography, especially in identifying more situated relationships between knowledge, practice and 
action and over methodological concerns in forms of critical ethnography as method in cultural 
geography (Cloke et al.  2004, Anderson 2009).   
 
Over recent years there has been a more direct and sustained engagement with pragmatism in 
geography.  A themed issue on pragmatism and geography in Geoforum in 2008 identified how 
pragmatism’s anti-foundational, anti-dualistic thinking and its recognition of the situatedness and 
contingency of knowledge acquired through action particularly resonates with prevailing 
concerns in geography. It emphasised the significance of context and contingency in economic 
geography (Barnes 2008); of democratic action in urban space (Bridge 2008, 2005); and the 
significance of neo-pragmatists, such as Bernstein (1991, 2010), Shusterman (2000) and Rorty 
(1982), in connecting pragmatism with continental philosophy to provide a renewed geographical 
epistemology and methodology (Hepple 2008).  Furthermore, the significance of pragmatism for 
understanding space was explored: in how it provides a relational understanding of space and 
place (Cutchin 2008) and indeed (in terms of the focus of this paper), with pragmatism, non-
representational theory, assemblages and actor networks (Jones 2008). Allen (2008, 2016) took 
topological idea of space developed by geographers and inflected it through pragmatism into an 
idea of power as contingent, situational and a shared experience.  Conversely, he showed how 
the topological view is reflected back onto pragmatism to enhance its processual and relational 
idea of action.  Engagements with pragmatism in geography have continued on a number of 
fronts: on space and radical democracy (Barnett and Bridge 2013) and pluralist critique (Barnett 
and Bridge 2017) on process pragmatism as a guide in ‘engaged’ geographical research (Harney et 
al 2016); on ‘discursive’ economic and political institutions (Fuller 2016); on human habits and 
the environment (Dewsbury 2011, 2015; Schwanen et al 2012; Pedwell 2016; Bridge 2019).  
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These contributions run alongside the growth of pragmatist thought in other social sciences such 
as sociology (Baert 2005), in urban studies and planning (Hoch 2019, Lake 2017, Healey 2009) 
and in environmental studies (Light & Katz 1996; Weston 1985; Norton 1984; Minteer 2012).   
 
Whereas the presence of pragmatist thought has been felt across a range of themes in human 
geography I believe some of the implications of this thought could be pressed much further. 
Indeed, the nature of geography as a discipline, with its focus on organism-environment 
relations, is ideally suited to this development.  In this paper I want to illustrate this using the 
examples of assemblage theory and Actor Network Theory.  I explore the pragmatist influences 
on assemblage and actor network theories and go on to argue how acknowledging the full 
implications of those influences starts to reshape these theories, and in particular their 
spatialities.  I suggest that it points to a radically contingent and empirical (rather than 
transcendental) form of hyper-relational space, but one that situates (in a profound sense of that 
word) human experience and human reason, even allowing for human experience being 
relativized as just one component of the assembly/network within those spatial networks and 
assemblages.  The differences a thoroughgoing pragmatist reading makes to assemblage theory 
and ANT reflects, I argue, broader implications for progressing human geography more 
generally.  First, though, I explore some of the philosophical resources that pragmatism offers by 
focusing on one particular pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey, and his conception of human-
environment relations through his ideas of transaction, experience, situation and inquiry and how 
these relate to assemblage theory and ANT. 
 
 
Transactions, experience and situations in assemblages and Actor Networks 
John Dewey (1859-1952) absorbed deeply the implications of Darwin’s theory of evolution in his 
social philosophy.  Darwinian naturalism reveals the contingency of human organic existence (in 
the arc of evolution) and the vulnerability of human activity and fallibility of human knowledge 
in negotiating a world “with a sense of dependence upon forces that go their own way without 
our wish or plan” (Dewey 1983: 200).  It also reveals how human organisms are vulnerable to 
those wider forces because they are imbricated in them. Dewey’s idea of transaction captures the 
co-constitutive relationship between objects and organisms, indeed the term transaction is a 
revision of his earlier term interaction (Dewey and Bentley 1949).  Interaction, Dewey felt, might 
imply that the relationship was between finalised or complete objects and organisms.  
Transaction was a better term to convey the fact that the relationship was co-constitutive, in 
which both elements had effects, including objects ‘calling out’ or objecting to responses in 
human organisms: Dewey refers to “affectual and volitional objects” (1981: 30).  Transactions 
involve a degree of co-constitution such that human organisms’ responses to a stimulus, such as 
an object, are not to the stimulus but into it (Dewey 1896). No objects or subjects are finalised or 
rounded-out: they are contingent, and unfinished. Transactions are processual - and all 
phenomena (organisms and objects) are sequences of events: “every existence is an event” (63)1.  
 
1 Bignall (2015) explores the convergence of Dewey and Deleuze in their event-based 
philosophies. 
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Assemblage theory and ANT’s concern with emergence and with how objects and organisms are 
co-related was thus at the core of Dewey’s philosophy (involving a rejection of the subject-object 
dualism). Process, event, contingency, heterogeneity, connections and relations are all features 
shared with assemblage thinking (Anderson et al 2012). 
For Dewey, those complexes of transactions in which organisms are a part comprise experience. 
Experience is objective (rather than subjective) in the sense that it is comprised of transactions 
that are material-organic relations.   
 
Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience that is experienced but nature- stones, 
plants animals, health temperature, electricity and so on.  Things interacting in certain ways are 
experience: they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural 
object – the human organism – they are how things are experienced as well.  Experience 
reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an infinitely elastic extent. It 
stretches. (Dewey 1981: 12-13, emphasis in original) 
 
Experience is the objective outcome of complexes of transactions. It is objective in that it can be 
comprised wholly of objects and organisms and the certain ways they interact.  Those 
transactions involving humans constitute a form of experience in a continuum (from embodied 
through to reflective): how things are experienced. Complexes of transactions involving human 
organisms are also objective in that they are in part comprised of objects and their effects as well 
as having objective force in the world (rather than experience being about individual subjective 
states).  Experience is what James called, and Dewey endorsed, the process of experiencing as 
well as accumulated experience:  
 
[experience] is ‘double-barrelled’ in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division 
between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed 
totality. ‘Thing’ and ‘thought’ . . . are single-barrelled; they refer to products discriminated by 
reflection out of primary experience. (Dewey 1981: 18-19)   
 
Experience is largely not about knowledge (or at least ‘known’ knowledge) but of non-cognitive 
engagement with a world that is undergone: suffered and enjoyed (‘had’ knowledge). It is 
connective and networked, rather than being particularistic.  It is a prospective objective force in 
the world, always moving forward “all living is a going-on, and futurity colours the qualities of 
any situation into which organic factors enter as components” (Dewey 2012, 340 emphasis in 
original).  From this perspective human experience consists of a series of overlapping and 
interpenetrating transactions (Muhit 2013) in what Dewey called ‘situations’. 
 
‘Situation’ stands for something inclusive of a large number of diverse elements existing 
across wide areas of space and long periods of time, but which, nevertheless, have their own 
unity”. (1989: 281) 
 
Situations’ reflect the complexity of relations between material and organic components (Dewey 
1984; 1986; 2012). There are ‘extensive and enduring’ situations of what Dewey calls 
‘togetherness’: 
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Because everything experienced is determined by interactivity of organic-ongoing conditions, 
everything inquired into and discussed belongs to a field or situation.  Fields and/or situations 
possess spatial and temporal togetherness of the existences and events that constitute them.  
They are extensive and enduring.  ‘Togetherness’ as used here covers what is often named by 
the words connections and relations, and interconnections and relationships.  I have 
employed a word derived from the word together because I want to avoid as far as possible 
prejudgment regarding the kind of way or ways in which things go and come together in 
forming situations. (Dewey 2012, 334-5) 
 
There is a strong note of naturalism here, in the sense of Dewey not wanting to prejudge “the 
way or ways in which things go and come together”.  He is not assuming that human activity 
brings situations into being nor even that interconnections are primarily organic.  Indeed, 
elsewhere he argues, “the action called organic is not just that of internal structures: it is an 
integration of organic-environmental connections” (Dewey 1981: 213).   Equally, using the term 
‘things’ is neutral with respect to the components that make up the situation.  Again, there are 
parallels with assemblage and ANT here, in the sense that there is no strong ontological 
privileging of the human elements of the network or assembly in understanding its formation or 
coherence. However: 
The more complex is an organism the greater the variety of activities in which it engages and 
the more intricately are its diverse actions bound up with one another.  Its environment is 
correspondingly spread out in time and place and contains a similar variety of factors which 
sooner or later have to be dealt with. (2012, 327). 
 
Extensive and enduring situations can be seen as networks, assemblages or fields through which 
human organisms meet the challenges of the environment.  They are dispersed fields of 
dispositions of problem-responsiveness (involving organisms and objects).  Relations in 
networks can become unstable and unpredictable in which case the more immediate situation 
becomes doubtful or disturbed. This is a “problematic situation” (Dewey 1986) in which 
activities of inquiry and problem-solving are thus brought to the fore.  These activities are 
practical and comprised by the socio-material contexts in which they operate as forms of 
controlled inquiry, or practical reason. 
 
Practical reasoning in assemblages and networks 
Practical (as opposed to theoretical) reasoning involves the co-implication of organisms and 
objects.  This is evident in the sequence of action that Dewey identifies as enquiry (Dewey 1986).  
The antecedent conditions of enquiry are themselves material and ‘objectful’: “the biological 
antecedent conditions of an unsettled situation are involved in that state of imbalance in organic-
environmental interactions …” (1986: 110).  Thus “the indeterminate situation comes into 
existence through existential causes” (111).  Indeterminate situations are first felt, rather than 
thought. Affect itself is situational as it pervades the unique combination of materials and 
organisms that comprise the situation: “We are doubtful because the situation is inherently 
doubtful” (109, emphasis in original). There are parallels here again between assemblage and 
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situation in that both acknowledge that affect is non-individual and is distributed through the 
assemblage (Deleuze) or the situation (Dewey).  
The early phases of action in problematic (uncertain, uncanny) situations draw on affect and the 
dispositional resources of the body (habits).  Existing habits are the first resource to resolve 
encountered problems. They are in the form of ‘had’ (rather than ‘known’) knowledge or 
embodied intelligence.  Initial interventions are mostly physical and phenomenal: to re-arrange 
the existences of the situation. As Dewey has it “… restoration of integration can be effected, in 
one case as in the other, only by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not by 
merely ‘mental’ processes” (Dewey 1986: 110) and further “ … resolution of the indeterminate 
situation is active and operational” (111).  Furthermore, habits are not confined to individual 
bodies but are shared dispositions.  These dispositions are loaded with material and non-organic 
relations, “functions and habits are ways of using and incorporating the environment in which the 
latter has its say as surely as the former” (Dewey 1983: 15, my emphasis).  Habits are not purely social 
or cultural but contain structures of the environment: they are material and ‘objective’ in that 
sense. In assemblage/ANT terms they are one aspect of a live environment that ‘lives’ through 
embodied habits. 
If habitual responses are unsuccessful the problematic situation is pushed into more reflexive 
responses from humans and engage reflexive problem solving (the mentalistic phase of action 
called ‘thought’).  In ongoing transactions objects become events that are filled with meanings 
that depend on the context of the problematic situation: in how they problematize the situation 
for human organisms; in the way that they ‘object’ or oppose or in what they ‘call out’ from 
humans.  Nonhuman entities may present ‘propositions’ (Latour 2004). A persistent problematic 
situation pushes the response into the mentalistic phase of action involving trial and error and 
experimentation in a form of controlled inquiry.  This is a sequence of coordinated action and 
experimentation, not individualised reflection.  What Dewey calls ‘the institution of the problem’ 
and the ‘problem-solution’ (1986) are determined by context.  The particular combination of 
elements in the ‘problematic situation’ helps frame thinking. 
There are several aspects of the Deweyan idea of ‘thinking’ to consider here.  First, reflective 
consciousness is a relatively specialised and restricted aspect of nature.  The conditions that allow 
consciousness to exist have been limited over the sweep of evolutionary history.  Furthermore, a 
good deal of what constitutes organic activity (including the activities of human organisms) is 
non-conscious.  Ongoing activity, including responses to novel or problematic situations, 
involves psycho-physical responses that never reach the phase of action we might call conscious, 
let alone reflexive consciousness, or rational thought.  Secondly, when ‘thought’ does occur it is 
not an individualised cognitive activity but rather ‘mind’ is socially shared and communicative, 
involving cooperation and conflict.  Thirdly, thought is a later phase of action imbricated in 
practical activity, rather than being abstract pure cogitation.  Thought is engaged to try to make 
an uncertain problematic situation clearer, less threatening, more stable, in order for activity to 
continue (Dewey 1986).  Contestation and conflict are inherent in problematic situations, which 
are in part an objection by the environment, the objecting qualities of objects, inducing a clash of 
habits and, if it gets that far, competing arguments and justifications for ongoing action.   
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Pragmatism here is displacing and dispersing ‘thought’ into the networks of activity in which it is 
seen as being embedded.  It is also emphasising the significance of embodied dispositions in 
ongoing human activity.  This parallels the significance given to bodies and affect in assemblage 
theory (Thrift 2007).  At the same time, rather than displacing and dichotomising thought away 
from affect and embodiment (to privilege the former) a pragmatist approach sees these qualities 
as different phases of action of which temporality and, I argue, spatiality are defining qualities.   
 
 
The spatialities of practical reason 
From this pragmatist perspective rational inquiry is not abstract reflection on an objective world 
but rather experimental intervention in the conditions of the world in the process of ‘clarifying’ 
or (temporarily) settling them.  To the temporality of reason and its implication in unique 
situations I would add spatiality as part of this phenomenal intervention of reasoning.  One is 
ratiocination which, rather than the calculation of equivalence or proportion in traditional ideas 
of rationality, is action in coordinating the situation.  This involves the spatialised attributes of 
organic elements.  As Dewey argues:   
In contrast with lower organisms, the more complex forms have distance receptors … what is 
done is response to things nearby is so tied to what is done in response to what is far away, 
that a higher organism acts with reference to a spread out environment as a single situation (…) 
an organism acts with reference to a time spread, a serial order of events, as unit, just as it 
does in reference to a unified spatial variety.  Thus an environment both extensive and 
enduring is immediately implicated in present behaviour. (1981: 213, my emphasis).   
This integrative capacity of higher organisms is especially marked in humans.  Writing a century 
before assemblage theory Dewey argues that: 
Everything that exists in as far as it is known and knowable is in interaction with other things 
… There is … nothing new or unprecedented in the fact that assemblage of things confers 
upon the assembly and its constituents, new properties by means of unlocking energies 
hitherto pent in.  The significant consideration is that assemblage of human beings transfers 
sequence and co-existence into participation. (Dewey 1981: 138) 
Participation is an outcome of the more extensive and enduring situations of problem-
responsiveness2.  It involves habits that incorporate the structures of the environment.  Further 
ramifying these pathways is the added mobility provided by the communicative action of human 
organisms.  Performatives in speech and written language are both contextual (indexical) to 
specific situations, and mobile in that they set the potentialities of objects in motion. Thus, when 
shared through linguistic action, rather than relying on ‘brute circumstance’, “[the object] is an 
immediately recognised and possessed trait; the flower means portability instead of being simply 
 
2
 There are strong parallels here with Foucault’s (1998) idea of extensive regimes of 
problematisation – see Koopman 2011; Barnett and Bridge 2017) and further argument later in 
the paper. 
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portable” (Dewey 1981, 142).  But linguistic action, in pragmatist terms, is also a form of 
commitment; in the way that it binds participants in communication to certain forms of 
intelligibility and performative credibility that are the explicit outcomes of the sense-making 
implicit in semantic meanings.  As Brandom (1998) conceives it, they are responsibilities in that 
they involve commitments and justifications that meet in the space of reasons (Sellers 2007).   
This has the effect of extending the actual and potential connections of problem responsiveness 
in ramifying ways:  
when experience does occur, no matter at what limited portion of time and space, it enters 
into possession of some portion of nature and in such a manner as to render other of its 
precincts accessible. (1981: 11-12) 
Actor Network and assemblage theories pluralise what are conceived of as the active elements in 
networks of effect. The greater range of actants, and the role of objects as consummation of 
activity, pluralises the networks that are coordinated.  Coordination is more complex, the issues 
emergent, and the environment more demanding of rationalities of coordination.  In assemblage 
theory the transitional coherence of assemblages is a result of productions of desire (will) in 
collections of desiring machines.  From a pragmatist perspective affect is distributed (situational) 
but that very distribution engages continua of activity, from affect, to embodied habit (as a 
distributed disposition) through to reflective thinking (as a form of experimental action) and 
back again. 
The argument here is that reasoning is deeply implicated in contextual material-environment-
organism transactions.  The problematisations involved in reasoning do however start to 
discriminate the particular qualities of transactions.  First, “[n]o inanimate thing reacts to things 
as problematic” (Dewey 1988: 179).  The way that problematic situations feel (as situations, 
rather than individual ‘feelings’), the way that problems are instituted (in part materially 
conditioned) is also a result of human capacities for communication.  Humans problematise 
‘things’ when things act in certain ways (obstructing, confounding, objecting).  However, 
although nonhuman organisms and objects have these effects, they do not take the perspective 
of others into account when acting (Jarolmack and Tavory 2014, 69).  In contrast, the social 
environment in which humans act is replete with mutual anticipations and perspectives.  These 
have the effect of conditioning actions and binding in participants (even if in conflict).  Human 
communication itself is a form of mutual perspective-taking and turn-taking as a form of 
performative action (as revealed in the pragmatics of communication, such as in Speech Act 
Theory - see Austin 1962). 
This more distanciated, worldly view of human action and experience, involving affect intensities 
and more distributed ‘thinking’ shot through with environmental structures, has been greatly 
enriched and expanded by neopragmatist philosophers, especially Bernstein (2010), Shusterman 
(2000, 2012), Rorty (1982) and McDowell (1996).  Richard Bernstein (1991, 2010) was 
instrumental in opening up the channels between pragmatism and continental philosophy, in 
emphasising their common anti-foundationalism, but in also recognising the contribution of 
continental philosophers to a deeper understanding and acknowledgement of humans as subject 
to wider, wordly forces.  Two illustrations of this come from John McDowell’s idea of the 
conceptual realm and Richard Shusterman on affect.   
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In Mind and World McDowell (1996) drew on Wittgenstein to argue that the conceptual realm is 
not confined within the cogitating mind but extensive and continuous with nature.  This 
unbounded conceptual realm, he argues, gives humans access to knowledge of a reality 
independent of them but in a world that also imposes rational constraints on them (McDowell 
1996, see also Bernstein 2010). In a similar vein, in terms of affect, Shusterman argues against 
the passive idea of the body in science and the discursively defined body of cultural studies, to 
argue for a focus on the body through pragmatist somaesthetics, in which soma is a “living, 
feeling, sentient, purposive body” (Shusterman 2008, xii).  Soma is not confined to the body but 
is more extensive and transactional (in Dewey’s terms) with the environment, involving habit 
which embed environmental structures (Dewey 1983, see Bridge 2019).  Shusterman draws on 
Dewey’s idea of ‘body-mind’ (Dewey 1981, 191-255) as a continuum rather than a dualism.  The 
body exchanges energies with the environment “as much in process ‘across’ and ‘through’ skins 
as in process ‘within skins’ (Dewey and Bentley 1991, 119, see also Sullivan 2001 for a pragmatist 
feminist interpretation).  In terms of the concerns of this paper, Malecki and Schleusener (2015) 
explore what they see as the strong synergies (and distinctions) between Shusterman and 
Deleuzian thinking in terms of ‘affect politics’ (see Massumi 2015). 
 
Pragmatism, assemblage, ANT and geography 
Before drawing out the implications of these pragmatist ideas of transaction, experience and 
situation for ideas of relational space in human geography, I look back at some of the original 
influences of pragmatism on assemblage theory and ANT to indicate how pushing these 
pragmatist principles further makes a difference to how these approaches are currently used in 
geography.  It points to more radically empiricist understanding of the spatialities of assemblages 
and actor networks avoiding some of the more transcendental elements of assemblage theory in 
particular. 
Pragmatism influenced ANT through Latour’s interpretation of the classical pragmatist William 
James’s idea of radical pluralism (James 2012 [1909] – see also Marres 2007, Latour 2008, 
Koszanowicz 2016; Hennion & Muecke 2016).  James’s pluralism ranged from metaphysics (an 
indeterminate pluriverse) through to forms of consciousness and experience across species 
(Goodman 2012) in networks involving objects “[as] plural and open, an expanding tissue of 
heterogeneous realities, but connected loosely, ‘still in the process of making’ as James nicely 
puts it” (Hennion & Muecke 2016, 302 see also Latour 2008). Elsewhere Marres (2007) uses 
Dewey’s The Public and its Problems (1984) to establish the significance of an issue-based approach 
to the formation of publics in complex social and material entanglements (or Actor Networks) in 
what she calls the socio-ontological aspects of Dewey’s philosophy; socio-ontological aspects 
which I explored further in the previous section of this paper.  
In assemblage theory Deleuze’s idea of exteriority of relations (Deleuze 1991; 2002) was again 
adapted from William James’s work (1977) to suggest that the objects or components of an 
assemblage have an autonomy which enables them to have relations outside the assemblage.  In 
geography Anderson et al (2012) interpret this in as things being conditioned, but not 
determined, by their relations, and relations having autonomy from the terms related (see also 
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Robbins and Marks 2010). This opposes an organic view of relations being solely composites of 
the organic whole (interiority of relations).  The point of this is to suggest a looser set of 
relationships both in terms of constant emergence of relations as well as the contingencies and 
transitions that assemblage theory emphasises.  It also suggests how parts of assemblages can be 
flipped and inserted into other assemblages without a reconfiguration of the whole.  This 
translates into spatial formations which that can rapidly detach from certain contexts and 
recombine in others, such as for example, in Muller and Shurr’s (2016) example of the global 
parental surrogacy industry.  Medelrieux (2015), however, claims that Deleuze’s interpretation of 
exteriority of relations owes more to Bertrand Russell’s atomist ontology (that in turn supports 
Deleuze’s idea of pluralism) than it does to James.  Following James’s rather than Russell, 
Medelrieux asserts, would have rendered relations of exteriority (or interiority) purely as an 
empirical question, rather than a transcendental and metaphysical claim that relations are 
necessarily exterior to their terms.  Some assemblages may be more ‘interiorised’ in their 
relations than others.  As we have seen from Dewey some ‘problematic situations’, for instance, 
are characterised by a togetherness of components in a qualitative whole. Terms related in these 
cases are related through human experience and inquiry.   
A second implication of the radical empiricism of pragmatism relates Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) ideas of ‘territorialisation’ and ‘de-territorialisation’ (stabilisations/de-stabilisations of the 
assemblage). Bowden, Bignall and Patton (2015) explore how Deleuze and Guattari replaced 
classical pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce’s (1992; 1998) semiotics and signifier-signified 
relations with territoriality and de-territorialisation. Rejecting what they saw as the restrictions of 
linguistic presuppositions in Peirce’s work they wanted to experiment beyond established strata 
of signification (of which the attempt to analyse normalises dominant relations). They also saw 
how minor interpretations can de-territorialise signs and can re-assemble in new 
territorialisations.   
According to Deleuze and Guattari, this complex process of semiotic release and capture – of 
critical de-territorialisation and creative re-territorialisation- is the proper aim of pragmatic 
thought: “Experiment,” they urge, ‘don’t signify and interpret [Deleuze and Guattari] (1987, 
141). (Bowden, Bignall and Patton, 2015, 7) 
Ideas of territorialisation and de-territorialisation have been deployed in geography – including, 
for example, population geography (Duffy and Stojanovic 2018) and political geography 
(Dittmer 2013; Muller 2015).  As well as being suggestive metaphors Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ideas of territorialisation and deterritorialization as critique of linguistic presuppositions/semiotic 
systems resonate with the poststructuralist impulses of geography in conveying the co-
emergence of spatial relationalilities and affectual/discursive formations. Again, though, as 
Patton (2016) argues, Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of territorialisation and 
deterritorialization relies on a transcendental quality, that of the idea of ‘absolute 
deterritorialization’ (or evisceration of meaning) against which semantic formations are to be 
judged.  Degrees of territorialisation or deterritorialization, from a pragmatist perspective, are 
again, wholly empirical questions, open to empirical comparison, rather than being judged 
against some transcendental yardstick.  
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Pragmatism gives a much more radically empirical reading of ideas of process, emergence, 
immanence and virtuality than those that have become more pervasive in geography. Emergence 
is central to Deweyan process philosophy (in common with assemblage thinking), showing 
qualities of immanence (Bignall 2015, Pappas 2008).  Again though, pragmatism situates human 
experience in this emergent, immanent world.  Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of ‘virtuality’ (as the 
‘thingliness’ of things - a tension between potential and realization) captures the immanent 
potentialities of assemblages, giving them overall coherence.  Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming 
is also about potential other states, part of the wider 20th century critique of the metaphysics of 
presence in which his works sits.  Dewey too rejects the metaphysics of presence as part of his 
overall critique of philosophy’s mistaken quest for certainty (Dewey 1988; Garrison 1999).  His 
event-based processual philosophy is concerned with emergence, waxing and waning, beginnings 
and consummations, consummations that are in turn beginnings.  The absence of essence, 
permanence and certainty points at the same time to possibility, contingency and potentiality.  
Events imply possible alternatives; presences suggest absences: 
“The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides what happens in the 
seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped” (Dewey 1981: 44-45)  
“… [ we cannot render things] ‘wholly present ... or so completely present as to exclude 
movement and change” (Dewey 1981, 384) 
“ … there are at a given time unactualised potentialities in an individual [object or organism] 
because and in as far as there are in existence other things with which it has not yet 
interacted” (Dewey 1991: 109). 
For Deleuze this is not just limited to things in existence but to potentialities. This is true of 
Dewey too: virtuality is relations that have not (yet) been grasped.  However, virtuality is at its 
height in the capacities of human organisms to ramify their connections, including to 
connections as yet ungrasped, but also to integrate them according to the exigencies of 
situations. This is especially emphatic when reflective intelligence is engaged, which for Dewey 
exists in large inclusive systems of connections (rather than individual cognition) involving “a 
social medium of symbol use and thought connected to distal environments at both ends” and 
involving actions and their consequences (Godfrey Smith 2002, pS29).  Mind connects to the 
world via action, and new ideas, which change the possibilities of action, “[a]s ideas change there 
is a kind of action-at-a-distance change that is made to things being thought about” (2002, S29).  
The relations in which they sit are changed, and changed relations, Dewey believes, are just as 
significant as changes to the intrinsic properties of things.  These changed relations have the 
potential for transformation, constrained by local powers of human action (Godfrey Smith 
2002).  Again, the emphasis here is on the nature of the empirics of changing relations rather 
than some more transcendental immanent force. 
In assemblage theory the distributed and extensive systems that cohere the assemblage are not 
cognitive and reflective but subconscious and unconscious desire in affect and emotion (as a 
form of will).  Rather than the interiorised, symbolic, domesticated (familial) idea of the power of 
the unconscious in traditional psychoanalysis this is an exteriorised, generalised, machinic, 
materialised and productive idea of unconscious affect.   
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Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire … The rationality, the efficiency, 
of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings into play, without 
the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 399).  
Deleuze (1991) was seeking to de-individualise Hume’s (1986 [1740]) idea of passion being the 
driver of reason and to place passion into the deeper immanent potentialities and emergence of 
assemblages and production of desire in ‘desiring machines’ within a broader critique of 
capitalism, liberalism and modernity (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).  This productive, machinic, 
materialised desire is implicated in capitalist modernity in the way that identities, locations and 
unconscious drives are fractured and recombined to serve forms of capitalist accumulation.   
The emphasis on emotion and affect is reflected across human geography as a whole (O’Grady 
2018; Thein 2005; Pile 2010) influenced in various ways by critical theory and psychoanalysis; 
poststructuralism and a turn to embodied geographies.  I have suggested how this distributed 
idea of affect and emotion is shared by pragmatism: material-organic ‘situations’ can be ‘fearful’, 
‘doubtful’, ‘joyous’, desiring, but, from this perspective, affect too is continuous with distributed 
idea of problematisation and reasoning.  These are phases of activity in situations of ongoing life, 
comprising materials and objects, human and non-human organisms. They are not an ontological 
ordering3 (in contrast Deleuze for whom ‘desire’ and its production is the key force). Affect is 
indeed distributed and situational but is also in a continuum with other phases of distributed 
action that include sub-conscious habit (again a more generalised, non-individual human 
disposition that contains environmental structures), as well as that phase of action known as 
thinking (social communication).   
 
Pragmatism for geography 
Geography has moved towards privileging these wider, distributed forces of affect but at the 
same time has held on to the tradition idea of reason – as cognitive, individual and instrumental: 
an exercise of sovereign will.  In contrast, in more vital environments with a greater plurality of 
actants, pragmatism recognises the role of mind, reflection and reason as also more distributed 
across ‘situations’ and environments.  In this way pragmatism offers the potential for geography 
to re-situate human reasoning in a more naturalistic register with a greater sensitivity to the 
environments and relationalities of thinking, in ways that philosophers of science have already 
discussed through ideas of ‘distributed cognition’ and ‘extended minds’ (Godfrey Smith 2002; 
Clark 2008).  This would help rebalance inquiry in human geography to take account of the 
effects of reflective and communicative action, alongside the current emphasis on affect and 
emotion 
Affect, thinking and habits are also subject to the wider forces of a nonhuman environment.  
Geographers have done much to acknowledge this worldliness, a world beyond humans, 
demonstrated in these ideas of assemblage, ‘vital’ or ‘more-than-human’ environments and post-
human geographies.  Environmental forces insinuate themselves into human bodies via habit 
 
3 This is reflected in a continuing debate in geography on the ontological status of assemblage 
theory – see Rogers (2018) for a recent contribution. 
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routines that compose the body in various ways.  These have been traced in geography through 
investigations of, for instance, landscapes of military drill (Dewsbury 2015); long distance air 
travel (Bissell 2015); transport planning (Schwanen et al, 2012); art encounter (Lapworth 2015) 
and mindfulness therapy (Lea et al 2015). Yet rather than a vitalist, there is also a pragmatist, 
understanding of this worldliness (an environment at once ‘precarious and stable’ Dewey 1981, 
see Rogers 2012).  Colebrook (2015) calls this an ‘inhuman pragmatism’: “a pragmatism that is 
not complacently for us” (p264, emphasis in original) but subject to the multiple finitudes of the 
forces that encompass humans.  She sees this as a pragmatism of genesis, which brings Dewey’s 
and Deleuze’s ideas closer together:  
For Dewey pragmatism is a genetic enterprise that allows us to see both the intellect and 
emotions as abstractions from complicated response networks: humans emerge from a 
contraction of habits, which are stabilised from unthinking networks of relations. There is 
one sense is which we can tie both Deleuze and Dewey to a broad Nietzschean approach to 
thinking about all aspects of life in terms of forces, such that what one believes and what one 
does make sense only as an aspect of a plane of relations that goes beyond the self. 
(Colebrook, 2015, 258-9) 
Dewey one hundred years ago was thus concerned with human experience, habits, situations, 
problematisations and action given all these assumptions about prevailing contingencies “and 
dependence on forces that go their own way without our wish and plan” (Dewey 1983, 200). 
Pragmatism acknowledges an environment that is active, co-implicating organisms and objects in 
transactions which ‘call out’ complexes of human action in space and time.  He was asking how 
human experience and reasoning function given an understanding of this more vital 
environment. The way that environment ‘calls out’ has consequences for human communication 
and participation, which, via linguistic complexes, involve commitments and responsibilities for 
action that extend and ramify the effects.  This is the limited, but specialised, nature of human 
experience in networks/assemblages and explains why, where it does operate, it tends to “render 
other of nature’s precincts accessible” (Dewey 1981: 11-12). Problematisation involves enduring 
and extensive situations, which are collectively drawn into selective application and emphasis 
through enquiry into problematic situations.  This suggests how time-spaces are heterogeneously 
connected into assemblages enabling action-at a-distance and ‘distance-at-an-action’: distance- (in 
time and space of the multiple environments of human experience)-at (or attending to)-an-
action’. 
The consequences of pursuing a more thoroughgoing pragmatism in relation to ANT and 
assemblage theory is to further naturalise these approaches (with a radical empiricism) and also 
to set them in the context of the effects of human experience on networks of relations in 
emergent assemblages.  This emphasis on transaction, experience and situation I think posits an 
idea of space that is hyper-relational (beyond the claims of ANT or assemblage theory) but at the 
same time identifies certain time-space orderings that come with the pragmatist idea of human 
experience.  These have implications for progress in human geography more widely.   
 
As we have seen, geographers have already travelled some way down the road of moving to a 
more pragmatist-inflected idea of relational space.  Although not arguing from a pragmatist 
perspective, Massey (2005) argues that space is not prior to identities/entities but is a constitutive 
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part of interrelations.  It is not a container against which relations between organisms and 
objects are established or broken.  For Massey ‘the chance of space’ is as a combination of 
purposiveness and contingency arising from simultaneous heterogeneity of objects and 
organisms, involving surprising juxtapositions and interactions.  This focus on relations in 
conditions of uncertainty has a very pragmatist tone. From a pragmatist viewpoint I suggest that 
interrelations (transactions) are not purely topological (the key register of relational geographies); 
they are not simply the connections between formed objects and discrete organisms with these 
relations possessing different levels of intensity or action-at-a-distance.  As well as not being 
prior to entities or organisms nor is space simply composed of their interrelations but is part of 
their ongoing constitution.  There are no nodes in the topology, only bundles of energy with 
fuzzy boundaries distinguished by different qualities of transactions.  So, rather than being object 
nodes or organism nodes in a topology in which space is characterised by the configuration of 
their interrelations with different intensities, space is part of the constitution of the nodes. This 
relates back to Dewey’s (1981) claims about the organism being defined not by its constitutive 
elements and organic unity or integrity, but by its connections to other things (or more strictly 
ongoing events).  We should see space as much more field-like, with blurred edges but 
nevertheless where those edges/peripheries are radically open and contingent.   
 
I think Dewey is pulling us towards an idea of space as field, or a series of overlapping fields, 
through his central idea of ‘situation’.  As we have seen, situations are defined by ‘togetherness’ 
in which no constituent entities or organisms have priority but nevertheless where there is an 
overall operative unity or coherence.  Situations or fields themselves are not like Venn diagrams 
or force fields but have transpositional qualities.  They can be “extensive” in space and 
“enduring’ in time, distanciated and loose, but then, as contingencies and interrelations interrupt 
the functioning of human organisms, this situation becomes problematic.  The multiplicity of 
times and spaces of diverse environments of ramifying human experience are selectively 
compressed through inquiry into the problematic situation (distance-at-an-action) producing new 
virtualities and ramifying its effects (action-at-a-distance) making ‘other of nature’s precincts’ 
available” (1981, 213).  Diverse time-spaces are not just ‘folded’ (in Deleuzian terms), but rather 
‘situated’ through the operation of human experience (socialised and embodied).  Space acts as 
both background (extensive-enduring situation) and foreground (problematic situation).  In 
some cases this may coincide with more traditional conceptions of space.  Thus Cutchin (2008) 
argues powerfully for ‘place’ as a “situated problematic”.  It is “localized and immediate in 
nature” but “it must stretch with us.  This is one of the reasons place is so hard to define and 
bound” (Cutchin 2008, 1565). 
 
I suggest that place is just one manifestation of a situated problematic.  There can be situated 
problematics that are ‘localised’, specialist and specific but are spatially distanciated (traced in 
many studies of the effects of globalisation for instance).  Equally there are ‘situated’ 
problematics, that are a response to the emergence of specific problematisations at a particular 
place and time, that become extensive in space and time.  Here there are connections to what 
one can see as the pragmatist strains of Foucault’s understanding of pragmatics of 
problematisation (Foucault 1998, see also Koopman 2011; 2018) and the way that problems 
become defined in discursive regimes operating in institutional forms such as public health 
(Foucault 2006); criminology and penology (1977) and sexuality (1986).  Foucault’s work also 
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reminds us of the range of spatialities involved, from the extensive discursive institutional 
regimes themselves to the specificities of space corporealized in discursive analysis and 
confinement of bodies.  There are rich possibilities for research in human geography in 
investigating space through the pragmatics of problematisation (Barnett and Bridge 2017).  This 
work also continues to develop the synergies between pragmatist and continental philosophy, a 
re-balancing that certain neo-pragmatists, such as Bernstein (1991), have long been calling for 
with some indeed favouring pragmatism, with “James and Dewey waiting at the end of the road 
which … Foucault and Deleuze are currently travelling” (Rorty 1982 xviii).   
 
The emphatic space of problematisation leads to experimentation.  Entities and relations in the 
problematic situation are manipulated in ways that are active and operational.  Relations are 
adjusted and, because of its constitutive role, space is part of this experimentation.  These spatial 
experiments have already been recognised in geography in various ways.  From a pragmatist 
perspective Allen (2016) shows how experiments with relations and interconnections (changing 
the topology) can, for example, give social movements temporary grips on power in a globalised 
world - directly connecting western clothing consumers to producers through anti-sweatshop 
campaigns. Equally, he argues, spatial experiments can also draw together dispersed publics 
through shared experience (especially in relation to power).  However, there is a further element 
to the relationalities of space beyond topologies which is the renewal of the experience of space 
through practice.  The artist Olafur Eliasson celebrates the idea of the relationality of space 
through human communication but also through the experience of the actualisation of space 
(Jellis 2015).  This relates much more generally to “how people are related practically to the 
world, in different situations, by mobilising space” (Lussault and Stock 2010, 17).  Using French 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ in which critique involves judgements that are situational, plural 
and dialogical, Lussault and Stock see the pragmatics of space seen as “a resource and condition 
of practice, mobilised in situations through ‘proofs’ (17): what they intriguingly depict as 
proofing space (as in experimenting, but also testing the resilience of, space, as strategy and 
justification).  In this way spatial experiments are a constant feature of human life.  I suggest this 
is a further element of hyper-relationality in which the topologies of actor networks or emergent 
assemblages are complicated by the plurality of sites of critique and ‘proofings’ of space.  This 
does not necessitate acceding to the separateness of spatial ontologies (witnessed in the 
ontological turn in geography) but rather to acknowledge how space is proofed in everyday 
practice within different worldviews as well as between them.  It is to acknowledge the 
contingent and provisional nature of space in human activity and the importance of dialogical 
engagement in judgement over that activity with critique as a proofing of space. Spatial 
pragmatics implicate co-constitutive relations in the contingencies of space which arise from 
problematisations.  They involve spatial experiments and agonistic trials (or proofings) from 
plural sites of critique and experience.  In this way they constitute the ingredients for more 
radically democratic projects (Lussault and Stock; Barnett and Bridge 2013). 
 
Conclusions 
The implications of a more sustained application of pragmatism to ANT and assemblage theory 
in geography are to suggest a more radically empirical pathway for human geography as a whole. 
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It means moving away from more transcendent impulses in the discipline (illustrated in 
assemblage theory in ideas of exteriority of relations, (de)territorialisation, virtuality as immanent 
becoming).  It also re-situates human activity in a more ‘vital’ environment. It both acknowledges 
the effects of acting things (human, nonhuman, objects) as well as the more distributed and 
environmentally embedded characteristics of experience, ‘mind’ and reason.  This also helps 
rebalance contemporary geographical accounts of human action (with its current, more exclusive 
focus on affect and emotion) without resorting to Cartesianism.  It also offers a provisional 
realism in acknowledging a worldly environment comprising forces that “go their own way 
without our wish or plan” (Dewey 1983, 200) with a renewed emphasis on problematisation and 
experimental action.  Pragmatism here takes in aspects of the flatter ontology that has become 
more pervasive in geography, to the extent that humans are amongst other actants (to use ANT 
language).  However, being part of a ‘problematic situation’ of which humans are one part, 
through problematisation, potentially involves transformation of the human organism (self and 
others) as part of resolution of the situation as a whole (a basis for radical democratic action).  
So, pragmatism offers geography a less hierarchical view of human nature (than Cartesianism or 
variants of idealism for instance) whilst acknowledging the distinctive traits of human experience 
and action at work in nature.  Problematic situations (of which humans are the problematising 
part) have hyper-relational consequences in time-space (beyond topological space).  This 
involves both action-at-a-distance as well as ‘distance (from the wider time-space situation)-at (or 
attending to)-an-action’.  As a constitutive component of organism-environment transactions it 
involves the contingencies of situated spatial experiments.  ANT and assemblage have started on 
this road of understanding situations.  A fully pragmatist human geography could take this much 
further with renewed focus on a (more modest, relational, distributed) idea of human 
‘reasonings’ through action. 
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